‘Taking One for the Institution’: Scapegoats, reputation management and selective accountability

BY STEPHEN KUHRT

There is a particular kind of sacrifice that institutions have always been rather good at demanding. When an organisation finds itself embroiled in scandal, when its reputation is damaged and public confidence threatened, someone must take responsibility. Ideally, that person should be sufficiently senior to make the sacrifice meaningful, but not so senior that their departure threatens the institution itself.

This is often the ethics of ‘taking one for the team’. Or, perhaps more accurately, the ethics of making someone take one for the team.

Genuine accountability involves acknowledging responsibility, exposing the circumstances that allowed wrongdoing to happen and changing the structures that made it possible. Institutional scapegoating, by contrast, involves identifying a relatively small number of individuals whose punishment or departure can be presented as a satisfactory resolution. The organisation survives, its leadership largely remains intact, and the public is invited to believe that the problem has been dealt with.

Three different but very current controversies illustrate this problem: Australia’s ‘Sandpapergate’ cricket scandal, the Church of England’s safeguarding crisis and the recent controversies surrounding Russell Brand and David Walliams.

Sandpapergate: three players and a national reputation

In March 2018, Australian batsman Cameron Bancroft was caught attempting to alter the condition of the cricket ball using sandpaper during the Test match against South Africa in Cape Town. Captain Steve Smith and vice-captain David Warner were implicated. Cricket Australia imposed severe sanctions: Smith and Warner received 12-month suspensions and Bancroft nine months.

The three became the public faces of Australian cricket’s disgrace. Their punishment demonstrated that the country would not tolerate cheating. Yet the subsequent review of Cricket Australia’s culture revealed an organisation characterised by arrogance, excessive control and an unhealthy emphasis on winning. Were three players really the whole story?

That question has returned forcefully in November 2026, following the publication of former Australian batsman Usman Khawaja’s autobiography, Sabr. Khawaja claims that knowledge of the ball-tampering extended throughout the Australian Test team, rather than being confined to the three punished players.

Warner has strongly endorsed Khawaja’s account, describing it as accurate and renewing his criticism of Cricket Australia’s original investigation. He has suggested that the three players unfairly carried the punishment.

Pat Cummins, a member of the 2018 team and now Australia’s captain, has vehemently rejected Khawaja’s version, insisting that he knew nothing about the use of sandpaper. Former squad member Chadd Sayers, however, has publicly supported the suggestion that knowledge of the practice was more widespread. Cricket Australia’s chief executive, Todd Greenberg, has refused to reopen the investigation, maintaining that the original findings remain valid.

These allegations do not establish that other players were guilty. Nevertheless, they raise an important question: was the original investigation an exhaustive attempt to establish the truth, or did it provide a convenient means of containing a national sporting scandal?

The three players were responsible for their own conduct. But if responsibility extended further, their punishment may also have served another purpose: protecting Australian cricket’s reputation by concentrating public outrage on a manageable number of individuals.

The Church of England: one Archbishop falls

The Church of England’s safeguarding crisis presents a considerably more serious version of the same institutional problem. This concerns the abuse of vulnerable people, the treatment of survivors and the responsibilities of those entrusted with spiritual and institutional authority.

In November 2024, publication of the Makin Review into the Church’s handling of the abuse perpetrated by John Smyth led to Justin Welby’s resignation as Archbishop of Canterbury. Church officials had known of serious allegations against Smyth since the 1980s. Welby had been informed in 2013 but failed to ensure that effective action was taken.

Welby’s resignation was presented, not least by the Archbishop himself, as an important act of accountability. But was the departure of the Archbishop of Canterbury sufficient? Could the Church genuinely claim to have addressed its safeguarding failures by removing its most senior figure while other senior leaders whose decisions were also under scrutiny remained in position? This question became particularly pressing in relation to the Archbishop of York, Stephen Cottrell.

Stephen Cottrell and the David Tudor affair

David Tudor was a Church of England priest with a history of sexual misconduct involving young people. He had been suspended from ministry for five years following misconduct involving a 16-year-old girl in the 1980s, before returning to ministry in the Diocese of Southwark.

When Stephen Cottrell became Bishop of Chelmsford in 2010, Tudor was already serving as an Area Dean, having been appointed under Cottrell’s predecessor. Cottrell allowed him to continue and be reappointed in that position and subsequently permitted his appointment as an Honorary Canon of Chelmsford Cathedral in 2015.

In my December 2024 article, ‘Why Stephen Cottrell should resign as Archbishop of York’, I argued that these decisions raised questions going well beyond whether Cottrell possessed the legal authority to remove Tudor from parish ministry.

An Area Dean is entrusted with significant leadership responsibilities, while an Honorary Canon is a position of considerable recognition. Given Tudor’s history, why had these positions of trust and honour been allowed to continue? Where was sufficient consideration of the impact on survivors?

I argued that Cottrell’s mishandling of Tudor was, in certain respects, even more troubling than Welby’s mishandling of Smyth. My concern was that the decisions revealed an institutional culture in which the status and standing of clergy could take precedence over the welfare of survivors.

While I concluded that Cottrell should resign, I was equally clear that the Church of England would probably never allow this to happen. I invoked Lady Bracknell’s famous observation in Oscar Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest: to lose one Archbishop may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose two looks like carelessness. The point was that the Church could manage and indeed use the departure of one Archbishop for its benefit. Two successive resignations connected with safeguarding failures, however, would make it much harder to maintain the impression that the problem was simply one of individual leadership. Having lost Welby, could the Church afford to lose Cottrell as well?

There was an important subsequent development. In January 2026, the President of Tribunals determined that there was no case to answer against Cottrell and no possibility of a tribunal finding that he had committed misconduct. The determination concluded that his decisions had followed the legal and professional safeguarding advice available to him. Cottrell nevertheless acknowledged that the reappointment of Tudor as Area Dean had not sufficiently considered the impact on those he had harmed.

This determination must be respected. But disciplinary accountability and wider ethical accountability are not necessarily the same thing. The absence of a disciplinary case does not automatically settle questions about leadership judgement, institutional culture and moral responsibility.

Russell Brand and David Walliams: when celebrity becomes institutional risk

The recent cases involving Russell Brand and David Walliams bring another dimension to the discussion: the relationship between celebrity, institutional power and the organisations that have benefited from the status of prominent individuals.

In November 2026, Russell Brand was convicted at Southwark Crown Court of one count of rape and three counts of sexual assault involving four women. He was sentenced to ten and a half years in prison. He was acquitted of two other rape charges and an attempted indecent assault charge. He has maintained his innocence.

The case has inevitably prompted questions about the entertainment and broadcasting industries in which Brand built his career. His celebrity, public persona and access to influential platforms formed part of the environment in which his abuse took place. The women who gave evidence described the difficulties of challenging someone with such prominence and influence.

The important institutional question is not simply why Brand has now been punished, but how the organisations that employed, promoted and profited from him understood their responsibilities. Individual criminal accountability does not necessarily resolve questions about the cultures in which powerful celebrities operate.

The allegations concerning David Walliams raise related questions, although the legal position is very different. In November 2026, an investigation by the Guardian and ITV News published multiple allegations concerning his behaviour towards young women and teenagers, including allegations involving women who said they first met him when they were 15.

Walliams has denied being a sexual predator and breaking the law. The Metropolitan Police has subsequently launched an investigation into separate allegations of serious sexual offences and is also reviewing the media reports. No finding of criminal wrongdoing has yet been made in his case.

Nevertheless, the controversy has already had institutional consequences. HarperCollins had previously severed its relationship with Walliams following an internal investigation into alleged inappropriate behaviour towards female employees. Following the recent reports, his literary agency dropped him, while the BBC began removing programmes featuring him from its iPlayer service.

These developments illustrate the difficult position of organisations whose commercial success has been closely associated with celebrity figures. When allegations emerge, there is an understandable desire to distance the organisation from the individual. But distancing oneself is not the same as accepting responsibility for the culture in which the individual operated.

The question is whether organisations are prepared to investigate their own practices, power relationships and failures of oversight, rather than simply removing a troublesome celebrity from their public-facing activities.

There is also a danger of confusing reputational management with justice for those who have suffered harm. The removal of a famous personality from a television programme or publishing list may be necessary, but it does not in itself establish that the institution has understood or addressed the circumstances that allowed the alleged behaviour to continue.

The institutional arithmetic of accountability

These cases are different, but they reveal a common tension between individual responsibility and institutional self-preservation.

In Australian cricket, three players were punished for ball-tampering, but recent revelations have reopened questions about how far responsibility extended.

In the Church of England, Justin Welby’s resignation became the defining public response to a safeguarding crisis, while questions about Stephen Cottrell exposed the difficulty of extending accountability to other senior leaders.

In entertainment, the cases of Brand and Walliams demonstrate how celebrity power can raise questions about the responsibilities of broadcasters, publishers and employers, as well as those of the individuals themselves.

There are important distinctions. Brand has been convicted of serious offences; Walliams faces allegations which remain under investigation; the cricketers were directly involved in sporting wrongdoing; and the Archbishops were challenged over their handling of abuse committed by others. These are not equivalent situations.

But all raise questions about how responsibility is allocated and where it ultimately stops. Taking one for the team can be honourable when it involves accepting responsibility for one’s own failures. It becomes ethically problematic when individuals are expected to absorb the consequences of collective failure so that an institution can protect its reputation and leadership.

Perhaps the most uncomfortable lesson is that organisations can become remarkably adept at demonstrating that they have punished wrongdoing without demonstrating that they have understood it. They can sacrifice individuals, issue apologies, commission reviews and announce reforms. They can even persuade themselves that they have acted courageously. But if the underlying culture remains untouched, the sacrifice has achieved little beyond protecting the institution.

The ultimate ethical test is not whether an organisation is prepared to lose someone to protect its reputation. It is whether it is prepared to confront itself to protect the people for whom it exists. That is the difference between genuinely taking one for the team and taking one for the institution.


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